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Recent Developments
Judgment Against Insured Is Conclusive Proof of
Amount of Claim Against Dissolved Insurer-
Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Seaboard
Mut. Cas. Co.*
Plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident, brought suits
against an insured taxicab company. Before the case came to trial,
the insurance commissioner found the insurer insolvent. In a sepa-
rate proceeding he obtained a court order dissolving the insurer, en-
joining the prosecution of any legal action against the insurer's
assets, and providing for the filing of proof of claims with the insur-
ance commissioner. The insurer's attorney, who had entered an ap-
pearance on behalf of the taxicab company, withdrew, and in an un-
defended action the plaintiffs recovered judgments against the cab
company totalling nineteen thousand dollars. Unable to obtain exe-
cution on these judgments and enjoined from proceeding by writ of
attachment against the insurer, plaintiffs filed claims for the nineteen
thousand dollars with the insurance commissioner. After presenta-
tion of plaintiffs' evidence, the commissioner, acting as a liquidator,'
concluded that the claims were exaggerated and allowed 2,500
* 415 Pa. 72, 202 A.2d 42 (1964) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
I. Sections 501-11 of the Insurance Department Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 201-11
(1954), provide for the liquidation of insolvent insurers by the insurance commissioner.
Statutory provisions vesting the liquidation of insurers exclusively in insurance com-
missioners are becoming increasingly common because court-appointed receivers have
tended to waste assets. Although the technical duties of statutory liquidators vary,
their general functions are analogous to those of receivers in bankruptcy. See generally
2 CoucH, INSURANCE 729-54 (2d ed. 1959).
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dollars. 2 The Court of Common Pleas affirmed, holding that the
judgments were not binding on the liquidator.2 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held, reversed, three justices dis-
senting. The amount of a judgment against a tortfeasor conclusively
establishes the amount of the injured party's claim against the tort-
feasor's dissolved insurer when the cause of action against the tort-
feasor arises prior to the insurer's dissolution.
Although insurance has traditionally been subject to comprehen-
sive state regulation,4 the liquidation sections of many state insur-
ance codes proville little guidance in administrative procedure.5 In
those states, claim allowance procedures are primarily set up accord-
ing to the insurance commissioner's discretion. Commissioners typ-
ically consider it within their authority to determine independently
the merit and amount of each claim.6 However, the commissioner's
wide procedural latitude may be limited by the policy underlying
the doctrine of collateral estoppel: a matter should be litigated only
once between the same parties.7 Thus, when a claim is based on a
judgment against an insolvent insurer prior to receivership, the liq-
uidator is obligated to honor the claim in the amount of the judg-
ment and is precluded from substituting an independent evalua-
tion.8 The court in the principal case extended the collateral
estoppel effect of the damage award by binding an insurance com-
2. When, as in the principal case, the liquidation is of a mutual insurance company
issuing assessable policies, the full amount allowed by the liquidator is generally
recovered by the creditor. If the liquidated assets are insufficient to satisfy all claims,
policyholders are assessed for the balance. See Boesel & Fieldman, Liquidation of
Mutual Insurance Companies in Wisconsin, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 493, 509-13; Klaprat,
Discussion of Liquidations of Insurance Companies, in 2 SYMPOSIUM ON INSURANCE
AND GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, pt. 3, at 73 (1960). In the liquidation of
other insurers and in bankruptcy proceedings, however, if the assets are in-
sufficient claimants receive a pro-rated share determined by the allowance and their
priority. See generally CoLi.ER, BANKRUPTCY § 65 (14th ed. 1964); MACLACHLAN,
BANKRUPTCY §§ 301-03 (1956).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Seaboard Mut. Cas. Co., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d
706 (C.P. 1963).
4. See generally 2 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 434-598; KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1960); PATrERSON, Tim INSURANCE COMMlSSIONER IN THE UNrrrn
STATES-A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE (1927); Kimball, The Purposes
of Insurance Regulations-A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45
MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961).
5. The Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner's claim allowance procedure is based
on § 506 of the Insurance Department Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 206 (1954), which
provides broadly that liquidation shall be "by and under the direction of the
Insurance Commissioner .... See Boesel & Fieldman, supra note 2, for an analysis of
judicial discretion in interpreting a "skeletal liquidation statute."
6. See Bennett, Liquidations of Insurance Companies, in 2 SYMPOSIUM ON INSURANCE
AND GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSrrY OF WISCONSIN, pt. 3, at 1 (1960). See also Beach, Judgment
Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 30 YALE L.J. 674 (1921).
7. See Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1,
27-38 (1958).
8. See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 671 (1947); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 485 (1935). See also 3
COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 63.
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pany which was not a party to the original proceeding and which was
not even in existence at the time the judgment was rendered.9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied primarily upon Riehle
v. Margolies,'0 a bankruptcy case" in which a claimant based the
amount of his claim on a judgment against the bankrupt corpora-
tion; the receiver decided that the claim should be tried de novo,
noting that although the cause of action had arisen prior to the com-
mencement of the receivership proceedings, the judgment had been
rendered after the proceedings had begun. The United States Su-
preme Court unanimously held that the receiver was not entitled to
a hearing de novo, and that the claim should have been allowed in
the amount of the judgment. The dissent in Seaboard emphasized
the distinctions between the principal case and Riehle.2 The cause
of action and judgment in Riehle were against a corporation in re-
ceivership, but in Seaboard they were against a company not in-
volved in the liquidation proceedings; 13 in addition, the judgment
in Seaboard was rendered not merely after a receiver's assumption of
control, but after dissolution. The significance of these distinctions,
however, is questionable. Since an insurer's contractual obligation
is to pay the insured's liability,14 it seems illogical to suggest that the
amount of the judgment is not binding upon the insurer, and there-
fore upon the liquidator, since the insurer's contractual right to de-
fend the insured 5 is one which the liquidator could have asserted
to protect the assets. In addition, there is case authority in partial
support of the majority position. In In re International Reins.
Corp.,O under facts almost identical to Seaboard, the Delaware court,
relying on the insolvency clause of the insurance contract,17 held that
9. Plaintiffs argued that, under the Insurance Department Act § 505, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 205 (Supp. 1963), the suspension of the insolvent company's operation
did not operate as a dissolution. Brief for Appellant p. 11. However, the court order
had been drafted under § 206, which specifically provides for dissolution.
10. 279 U.S. 218 (1929).
11. The Bankruptcy Act § 4, 30 Stat. 547 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), specifically
excludes insurance companies from its coverage. Nevertheless, since the liquidation of
insurance companies is in many respects analogous to bankruptcy proceedings, courts
often do not distinguish between the two actions for purposes of precedent and policy.
See, e.g., In re International Reins. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 34, 48 A.2d 529 (1946); Com-
missioner of Ins. v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 314 Mass. 558, 50 N.E.2d 801 (1943);
Commonwealth v. Union Cas. Ins. Co., 287 Pa. 6, 134 At. 435 (1926).
12. Principal case at 80, 202 A.2d at 45-46.
13. This distinction in many instances would be determinative since application of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel presupposes that the parties in both actions are
the same. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 79-111 (1942), for an explanation of the
general rule and the exceptions.
14. See generally BaArNARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 69-99 (1961).
15. Id. at 120-38.
16. 29 Del. Ch. 34,48 A.2d 529 (1946).
17. Under an indemnity theory, the injured party recovers from the tortfeasor who
is then reimbursed by the insurer. Arguably, when the tortfeasor is insolvent, the
injured party recovers nothing and the tortfeasor suffers no loss, so the insurer need
1296 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63
the injured party could proceed directly against the receiver to re-
cover the amount of the judgment.18
Nevertheless, the decision in the principal case has created prac-
tical problems. Since the insurer's corporate existence ends upon dis-
solution and it is no longer able to defend suits against those it in-
sured, the possibility of uncontested suits and collusive judgments is
increased. It is imperative for the insurer to be represented at trial
in order to protect the interests of its policyholders, stockholders,
and creditors. Because of the nebulous considerations affecting awards
for pain and suffering, appellate courts often refuse to re-evaluate
tort damages even when the judgment appears excessive.' In the
principal case the attorney representing the cab company withdrew,
and a conservative interpretation of the evidence indicates that dam-
ages for pain and suffering constituted more than eighty per cent of
the total judgment.20 Yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
the commissioner's argument that the judgments were excessive, not-
not reimburse. Insolvency clauses prevent insurers from thus escaping liability. See
generally BRAiNARD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 132.
Insolvency clauses are mandatory in Pennsylvania. The relevant provisions of PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 117 (1954) are as follows:
"No policy of insurance against loss . . . resulting from [an] accident
for which the person insured is liable . . . shall hereafter be issued . . . in this
State . . .unless there shall be contained within such policy a provision that the
insolvency .. .of the person insured shall not release the insurance carrier from
the payment of damages ... and stating that in case execution against the insured
is returned unsatisfied [because of insolvency] in an action brought by the injured
person... then an action may be maintained by the injured person . .. against
[the insurer] ... for the amount of the judgment in said action, not exceeding the
amount of the policy."
18. In re International Reins. Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 34,,44, 48 A.2d 529, 535 (1946).
The value of International as precedent is somewhat limited since the receiver was
appointed, not upon dissolution of the insurer, but rather to continue its existence.
Nevertheless, the case would seem to answer the dissent's first distinction.
International was followed in Collins v. Dacus, 211 Ga. 779, 89 S.E.2d 198 (1955).
It is not clear in Collins whether the insurer was dissolved or merely suspended. The
question is moot, however, since Georgia provides by statute for the continuation of
all corporations for three years following dissolution. GA. ANN. CODE § 22-1874 (Supp.
1963).
19. See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 88 (1935).
20. Brief for Appellant, pp. 21-23, lla, 14a, 24a:
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ing simply that the argument was not supported by the record.
21
Legislation requiring or permitting the insurance commissioner as
liquidator to continue the defense of suits pending against insureds
would solve the problem of representation, but payment of attor-
neys' fees would further deplete the limited assets.m Furthermore,
any possibility of administrative expediency is negated if the statu-
tory liquidator is forced to wait for judicial determination of the
extent of liability.23 This problem, which was not readily apparent
in the principal case because the judgment was rendered within the
period established by the commissioner for the filing of proof of
claims, might be solved by allowing claimants to use judgments as
proof of claims only if the judgments are rendered prior to an arbi-
trary cut-off date. While this arbitrariness could be prejudicial where
crowded dockets delay adjudication, some adversity is inherent in
any liquidation proceeding.
Since legislative clarification seems desirable, Pennsylvania might
consider eliminating the problem at its source rather than attempt-
ing to patch, in piecemeal fashion, the difficulties involved. New
York has provided that judgments against an insured taken after the
date of the liquidation order are not to be considered as evidence
of liability or of the amount of damages.24 Although imposing an
additional burden on the injured party, New York does not prevent
him from having his claim allowed by the commissioner after a hear-
ing de novo.25 Fear of arbitrary administrative evaluation is allevi-
21. Principal case at 75, 202 A.2d at 44. By coincidence, the trier of fact who
awarded the $19,000 judgments was Judge Henry X. O'Brien, at present an associate
justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Had Justice O'Brien, who voted with
the majority in the principal case, been excused from the appellate decision, pre-
sumably the statutory liquidator's $2,500 allowance would have been affirmed by an
equally divided court.
22. The Michigan Insurance Commissioner, for example, has no attorneys on his
staff, and legal services in connection with liquidation proceedings must be paid for on
a fee basis from the company's assets. Interview with Michigan Insurance Commissioner
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jan. 22, 1965.
23. To expedite the liquidation process in Michigan, claim adjusters attempt to
settle all disputes and obtain releases from satisfied claimants. In addition, partial
dividends are declared periodically as assets are liquidated. Interview with Michigan
Insurance Commissioner in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jan. 22, 1965. Nevertheless, the
complexity of insurance lends itself to delay. Justice Musmanno characterized the
delay in the principal case (from 1952 to 1961) as "bureaucratic Rip Van Winkleism"
in an unpublished opinion written prior to reargument.
24. N.Y. INs. LAw § 544(4). This approach has also been adopted by Arizona,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-639(C) (1956); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4829(3)
(Supp. 1963); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 631.291(3) (1960); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, § 160(c) (1964); and Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1829(C) (1958).
25. N.Y. INs. LAw § 544(4). The Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner has reacted
to the principal case by refusing to accept the claims of injured third parties. Refusal
is based on the Insurance Department Act § 510, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 210 (1954),
which provides for distribution of assets to creditors, policyholders, and stockholders.
The commissioner contends that third parties are not included within the three
categories of section 510. Letter from Cecil P. Harvey, Special Assistant Attorney
1298 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65
ated by the claimant's right to a judicial appeal. Centralization of
control in a well-qualified insurance commissioner would place more
responsibility for decision-making in the governmental agency best
able to evaluate the interests of all parties concerned.
General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, November 18, 1964. It would seem
arguable, however, that when the insurer agrees to pay on behalf of the insured, a
creditor of the insured is likewise a creditor of the insurer.
